Aranes v. Occiano 380 SCRA 402; April 11,2002

ARANES v. OCCIANO

Topic: Formal Requisites; Authority of the solemnizing officer; how authorized

Nature of the Case: Petitioner Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law

Doctrine: Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3(FAMILY CODE), which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Facts:

Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the MTC of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

When her husband passed away, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy since the marriage was a nullity.

Respondent averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.

He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance and attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

Issue/s:

1)     WON the respondent may validly solemnize a marriage outside his jurisdiction

2)     WON Respondent should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license

Ruling:

1)No

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129, a judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos.

“A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the

officiating official to administrative liability.”

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

2) Yes

In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Tolentino v. Paras 122 SCRA 525; May 30,1983

TOLENTINO v. PARAS

Topic: Void Marriages; Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari; reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration . . . as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same"

Doctrine: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage

Facts: Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting.

Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy. Amado pleaded guilty and after he had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse—Maria Clemente."

Petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name in in a special proceeding for correction of entry. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding.

Petitioner filed a case against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1975, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship;  (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code—publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding which this Court has already dismissed, also for lack of the proper requisites under the law.

Issue/s:

WON the petitioner may validly rectify the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar

Ruling:

YES

Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected, is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved.

Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano 428 SCRA 735; May 20,2004

REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO-HAMANO

Topic: Void Marriages; Psychological Incapacity

Nature of the Case: Petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity

Doctrines:

• ·       Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
• ·       Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
• ·       As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
• ·       Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness.

Facts:

On January 14, 1988, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio were married in Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.

On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. The trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court held that: It is clear from the records of the case that Toshio failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. He remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child, which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to Toshio’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.

The Sol gen appealed to the CA but the same was denied.

Lolita exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. CA concluded that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to “observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support” pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The CA emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

Issue/s:

WON respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations

Ruling: No

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

** notes:

Molina Case: Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Santos Case:The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court

“psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Aquino v. Delizo 109 Phil 21

AQUINO v. DELIZO

Topic: Voidable Marriages; Grounds for annulment; fraud

Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari to review CA decision affirming CFI decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage with Conchita Delizo

Doctrine: Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3).

Facts:

Petitioner filed a case for annulment of marriage to the respondent on the ground that respondent allegedly at the date of her marriage to plaintiff on December 27, 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child.

In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

At the trial, only the plaintiff testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.

TC— dismissed complaint. noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.

Plaintiff  submitted "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.

CA - held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo  admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;

5. Birth Certificate of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;

6. Birth Certificate of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and

7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the time the picture was taken.

CA ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes," the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino may constitute fraud as would annul a marriage.

Ruling: Yes

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.

Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, it is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.

The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial (Affidavits), taken together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.

Dispositive:

Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial.