Magdalo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members, and Term of Office
DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties does not involve administrative
liability as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for
registration.
FACTS:
On 2
July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as
a regional political party based in the NCR for participation in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by
its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General,
Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
On 26
October 2009, the COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in
accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common
knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, and some members
participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala
Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle
gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence
and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws
of organized societies.
MAGDALO
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc
for resolution. MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections, in which
it stated that its membership includes former members of the AFP,
Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens. They filed an Amended
Manifestation, and in which they manifest that the instant MANIFESTATION is
being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only
and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration that
is still pending. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the Commission
but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Partys participation in
the Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition
is approved.
The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant Petition,
MAGDALO argues that the findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of
which the Petition was denied are based on pure speculation. The assailed
Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject
Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo
committed mutiny, held innocent civilian personnel as hostage, employed
violence and used unlawful means and in the process defied the laws of
organized society purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court
trying their case, (RTC Makati) has not yet decided the case against them; and
the Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to due process of law.
On the
other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the
eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party.
It contends that this determination, as well as that of assessing whether
MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence,
which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.
However,
MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority
to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the
latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.
ISSUE:
Whether
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve
its goals through violent or unlawful means.
HELD: NO
This
Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a
Petition for Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory
mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and organizations to
participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987
Constitution read:
ARTICLE
VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section
5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
x x x
x x x x x x
ARTICLE
IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The
Commission on Elections
Section
2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
x x x
x x x x x x
(5)
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise
be refused registration. x x x.
RA No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:
Thus,
to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step
process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal
Party v. COMELEC:
x x x
Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to
the
privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered
parties.
x x x
Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization
or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a
request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out,
accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Considering
the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the
eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation,
the pertinent question now is whether
its exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to
lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the
time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.
MAGDALO
contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied
the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record,
but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any
merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that
are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further,
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code,
specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value
to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice
of judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,this Court
explained as follows:
The
concept of facts of common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has been
explained as those facts that are so commonly known in the community as to make
it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it
indisputable among reasonable men.
The
Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it
a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took
cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence
thereon.
B. The COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful
means to achieve its goals.
In the
instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it
took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held
hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the
hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.
Under
Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means
shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61
of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its
goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
Violence
is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment
of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully
exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right,
against the laws, and against public liberty.
The Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As
publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives
were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former
President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the
supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the
President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to
resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by
civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and
plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to
ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the
government constituted clear acts of violence.
The
assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do
not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of
Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of force, violence
and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government
obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate
brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full
battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered
an alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the totality of
these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse
of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the
predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order
to achieve its objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks
to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a
prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO
contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals
through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of
guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence. This
argument cannot be sustained.
The
power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61
of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the
eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative
in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization
seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative
liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for
registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless
analogously applicable:
An
administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the
disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition
for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts. The
most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents
have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence the
quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The requirement
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that the proposed witness should not
appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line with the character and
purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed in
these cases. They are standards entirely different from those applicable in
administrative proceedings.
Further,
there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required
for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:
As an
administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at
hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest
standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.
In the
case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its
administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the
elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence
or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not
render an assessment as to whether the members of petitioner committed crimes,
as respondent was not required to make that determination in the first place.
Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the
necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a
political party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to
assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this
conclusion.
On the
other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of
MAGDALO with coup dtat following the events that took place during the Oakwood
siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary.
Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC and the criminal
case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances,
they nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring
different evidentiary thresholds.
This
Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the
subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that
transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of
violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
*Issue
on Mootness
whether
this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it specifically
asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of
subsequent elections.
xxxxxx
The
moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The
second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The
instant action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the
very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for
disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed
intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of
supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine
the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.
