Facts:
1.
By final
judgment we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by
affinity and is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City.
2.
During the
trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April
1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family’s
rented room to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and
ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her
mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything
but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After
making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter
allegedly resulted in Aileen’s pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother. When
confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her. Aileen’s
parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a
criminal complaint against petitioner
3.
Dr.
Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months
pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00
positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom she
named Leahlyn Mendoza.
4.
In his
defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was
already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having
an erection. He further averred that Aileen’s family had been holding a grudge
against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed
the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his
hometown of San Luis, Batangas
5.
RTC: Guilty
of qualified rape
6.
On
automatic review, we found that the date of birth of Aileen’s child was
medically consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that
Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the
prosecution’s contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old
baby by normal delivery.Thus, we affirmed petitioner’s conviction for rape
7.
3 years
after the promulgation of our Decision, Petitioner-relator
in this case, June de Villa (son of Reynaldo) alleges that during the trial of
the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic
review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity. This information was apparently furnished by the FLAG Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.
8.
Thus,
petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type
test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly
conceived as a result of the rape. – DENIED
9.
Reynaldo de
Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, wherein he once more prayed that
DNA tests be conducted.- DENIED with finality; final and executory
10.
Petitioner-relator
was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required
a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy
Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza,
to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did
so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who
immediately labeled the cup as “Container A.”
11.
Petitioner-relator
then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These
samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels and
temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).During transport,
the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.
12.
Petitioner-relator
requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn
Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given
by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save
for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory.
13.
After
testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report which showed that Reynaldo
could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the
absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner’s sample
and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn’s.
14.
Hence, this
instant petition for habeas corpus
a. DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY
THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION
FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED
RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE
b. A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF
THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED
Issue:
Held:
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent
to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the
child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial,
considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that
he sired the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he
argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus
to collaterally attack the 2001
Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted
to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered
evidence.
This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted
and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second,
the propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of
relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of
movement. Very broadly, the writ applies “to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person
entitled thereto”.
If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ
of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct
of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a
post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such
as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as
to such excess.
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to
assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal
ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the
deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court
imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to
seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This
relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early
case of Abriol v. Homeres, for example, this Court stated the general rule that
the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.
The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the
jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which
an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the
inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their
jurisdiction.
The reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v.
Court of Appeals: a habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the
record of the case. A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot
be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to
habeas corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of
depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or
on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law.
In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court’s
appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, as this is not the function of said writ. A survey of our decisions in
habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is
a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be
invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. We have been categorical in our
pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute
for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is
available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered by a court
or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated
that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted
even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.
xxx Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals this Court was inclined to
allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that case, we laid down
the general rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal restraint by
the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the
return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth a process
which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is
incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate
the apparent effect of such process.
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the
scope of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the
attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such
situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to
errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of
whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been restrained is
a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and
authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge
to render the order that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. It
is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction which makes it susceptible
to collateral attack through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v.
de Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right
has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-pressed to find
legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as
this Court sympathizes with petitioner’s plea, a careful scrutiny of the
records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner was
unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ
of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective
aid of counsel. In this instance, we note that the record is replete with
errors committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at
trial, denied the effective aid of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging
incompetent counsel to show that the attorney’s performance was deficient under
a reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial
would have been different with competent counsel. The purpose of the right to
effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair
trial.
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the
petitioner’s counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly
and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole
explanation that he was “leaving for the United States for an indefinite period
of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor.” In the face of this
abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented
from this withdrawal in a handwritten “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Opposition of Counsel’s Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court” received
by this Court on September 14, 1999. Petitioner alleged that his counsel’s
withdrawal is an “untimely and heartbreaking event”, considering that he had
placed “all [his] trust and confidence on [his counsel’s] unquestionable
integrity and dignity.”
While we are sympathetic to petitioner’s plight, we do not,
however, find that there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel
so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no
showing that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re- examination of the records of People
v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and
purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his
conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence
that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the
scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must,
therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the
child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza’s paternity is
not central to the issue of petitioner’s guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different
question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child.
Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of
the victim’s pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining
whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the
crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the
purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining
an individual’s guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support
to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small
measure, on the victim’s claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This
claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was
affirmed by this Court on automatic review.
The fact of the child’s paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant
to the civil award of child support. It is only tangentially related to the
issue of petitioner’s guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that
the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of
reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies
upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new
trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds.
Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon
finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of
purportedly “newly-discovered evidence”, i.e., the DNA test subsequently
conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered
as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment
was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the
evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence
falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of “newly- discovered
evidence”.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment.[52] It is essential that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or
during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered
after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for
“newly-discovered evidence” that would merit a new trial. Such evidence
disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of
DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court.
Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either
on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In either
instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled
rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was
guilty of neglect. A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the
latter’s mistakes and negligence. It is likewise settled that relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a
mistaken mode of procedure.
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence
presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de
Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is
not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still
stand, with Aileen Mendoza’s testimony and positive identification as its
bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy
of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape.
Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this
Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims
that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child
Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and
convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the
trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas
corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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