People v. Relucio

Facts:

1.     Accused:

FEDERICO RELUCIO @ "PEDRING"

EDRI PINEDA,

ROSENDO VELASCO @ "MANGYO", - APPELLANT

DANTE ARIOLA,

MIGUEL ESPEJO PADRONES @ "EGI", PETER DOE,

and RICHARD DOE,

2.     Appellant together with the other accused were charged with the murder with the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty of Gonzalo Talastas by shooting the latter on different parts of his body.

3.     Prosecution Witnesses:

Direct Evidence- Miguel Padrones, Crispin Angeles, and 3 others

·       Only Miguel and Crispin can be said to have given incriminatory evidence against appellant

Rebuttal Witnesses:

Miguel Padrones and 3 others

Defense Witnesses:

Accused Relucio and Velasco, Judge Vicencio and 8 others

Velasco testified again in rebuttal.

4.     CRISPIN ANGELES: There were material discrepancies with the testimony in court and the sworn statement (exh 17) of Crispin Angeles which the defense presented for impeachment purposes, strangely without objection on the part of the prosecution notwithstanding that the defense failed to lay the predicate therefor.

a.     In open court, he testified that in the afternoon of June 23, 1971, it was at the entrance of the Capital Theater that he met Talastas and invited him to see the movie but the latter said that he was waiting for Amanda. It turned out, according to Exh 17, that he and Talastas were still in Barrio Aduas, where they were staying, when Manda arrived with a woman companion and invited them to go to the "cine".

b.     In his testimony, he said that it was Amanda who left and did not go back anymore, while in the above statement, he declared that both of their two female companions told them they would only go to the comfort room but eventually disappeared. 

c.      In court, he said that when Manda did not return, he invited Talastas to leave but the latter answered he would wait for Manda's return. In Exh 17, it appears that he and Talastas agreed to follow and look for their lady companions and that he went ahead and Talastas stopped by the ticket booth.

d.     Whereas in court, he testified that he was already in the middle or across Burgos Street near the Avenue Theater when he heard shots inside the Capital Theater where Talastas had returned, as they met Federico Relucio with a companion, unknown to him, who were going inside, hence, he did not see who fired the shots, in the above sworn statement, he categorically stated that upon seeing Relucio, who had separated from his two armed companions and gone inside, he (Angeles) went back inside the theater and actually saw Relucio firing at Gonzalo and the latter retaliating with his own gun. In court, he said that when Talastas came out of the theater already wounded and running towards the east, the two companions of Relucio, referring to Velasco and Padrones, chased Talastas, with Relucio riding in a jeep and Padrones going on foot.

e.     In court, Angeles intimated that Padrones or Egi did not fire at Talastas, leaving the inference that it was appellant Velasco who was shooting the deceased

5.     In brief, in court, Angeles' account of the participation of appellant in the shooting of Talastas was vague and inconclusive; in his statement, Exhibit 17, nothing points definitely and specifically to appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and categorically referred to as having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones

a.     It results, therefore, that at least insofar as herein appellant Velasco is concerned, the testimony of Angeles has been completely impeached or discredited.

6.     MIGUEL PADRONES: The prosecutor asked for resolution of his motion to discharge the accused Miguel Padrones in order to be utilized as a state witness, on the ground that "this representation has found absolute necessity of the testimony of said defendant because the prosecution has no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of said Miguel Padrones; that the said testimony of the defendant Miguel Padrones could be substantially corroborated in its material points by the testimony of the other prosecution witness Crispin Angeles; that the said accused Miguel Padrones appears to be the least guilty and that he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude."

a.     No notice was given to the defense of the motion; it turned out it was filed after Angeles had already finished testifying

b.     Counsel for Relucio and Velasco protested they had no notice of the motion and objected to it contending that from the testimony of Angeles, Padrones did not appear to be the least guilty and that the prosecution had not shown that Padrones had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, but the trial court overruled them.

c.      Briefly, the testimony of Padrones on direct examination was as follows: While he was in the residence of Atty. Perez, "an information was received" ... from a person named Og that Gonzalo Talastas was inside Capital Theater. The "information" was addressed to the accused Federico Relucio who was then present together with Atty. Perez and two other persons not known to the witness.

d.     Then appellant Mangyo Velasco and two others unknown to the witness arrived. After these three arrived, "they (referring to "Relucio, Mangyo and the other two whom I do not know and I went to the Capital Theater". They went there "because Gonzalo Talastas was really to be killed." This, he was told by Relucio, for "according to Federico Relucio, Gonzalo Talastas was the one who killed his brother." He did not mention anything about any conversation among those present from which a conspiracy could be deduced.

e.     Upon arriving at the Capital Theater, Pedring (Relucio) went inside, while the witness and Mangyo and the two others were in front of the bowling hall. Padrones said they were all armed, but there was no suggestion that they did so with the intent to kill anyone.

f.      Not long after Federico (Relucio) entered the theater, there were shots (he does not know how many). "Not long after, the late Gonzalo Talastas went outside of the theater with a wobbling motion (susuray-suray), and wounded . . in his chest portion (where there was) blood." Gonzalo ran going towards "hulo" (east). Not long thereafter, Federico Relucio followed also wounded.

g.     Then, Mangyo (Velasco), the other two unknowns and Padrones "boarded a jeep and ... followed them (Talastas and Relucio) with us inside the jeep. " They followed them up to the Old Republic Telephone Company Building. Gonzalo "was running" and Relucio "boarded a tricycle, sir, following Gonzalo Talastas. " And when the witness and his companions were already in front of the Republic building, "Doon nga po pinagbabaril (si) Gonzalo Talastas. ... Mangyo and the other two whom I do not know and also Pedring, (Relucio) because Pedring arrived," were the ones who shot him, and Gonzalo died.

h.     After the cross-examination of Padrones, the prosecution rested its case, asking for and securing at the same time, the dismissal of the case against the accused Dante Arriola as to whom the prosecutor did not unexplainedly present any evidence.

7.     At this point, it may be stated relatedly that Our review of the records of this case has revealed a number of other loose ends in the proceedings which warrant special attention. Indeed, what must have been a preconceived plan of the prosecution to save Padrones and to pin down appellant instead is quite evident. And worse, it was not without significant, if perhaps unwitting, assistance from the court.

8.     Thus, having in view the testimony of Angeles We have discussed earlier, which had only a hazy reference to the supposed participation of appellant in the offense charged, and taking into account Exhibit 17, which the prosecution could not have been ignorant of, pointing to Padrones instead of said appellant as the one who chased and shot the deceased as the latter came out of Capital Theater, it is to be wondered how Padrones was selected as state witness.

9.     Moreover, from Padrones' own account, readily available beforehand to the prosecutor, he was with Relucio, who was the one who had the motive to do away with Gonzalo, earlier than appellant Velasco in the house of Atty. Perez, and there is no indication at all that before the group went to Capital Theater, appellant knew, unlike Padrones, that Gonzalo was to be killed. To reiterate, there is no evidence that the killing of Talastas was ever talked about in the house of Atty. Perez.

10.   In other words, the prosecution could easily have chosen other witnesses, even from among the other alleged participants in the affray, who appeared to have had minor parts therein, if not from the tricycle drivers who, from Padrones own account, must have seen what happened, and yet Padrones had to be the one allowed to go scot-free. Withal, the repeated references to unknown participants is unnatural. How could there be a conspiracy of the character charged in the information where four of the participants were not supposedly known to any of the witnesses who themselves are alleged to have been in the conspiracy? Why was Dante Ariola included in the information when there was absolutely no evidence against him? Why was Edri Pineda who was mentioned by Angeles in Exhibit 17 or Dante Ariola, who was also charged, not chosen instead? For that matter, why was Atty. Perez in whose house and in whose presence the plot to kill Talastas is alleged to have originated not among the accused?

11.   All these questions and many more are intriguing, but the most mystifying circumstance extant in the record was the attitude of both the prosecution and the trial judge in regard to what appears clearly to be a statement given by Padrones to the Cabanatuan City police in the person of a certain Patrolman Corporal J. S. Viloria on October 5, 1972 immediately after he was arrested. This is the same statement, Annex A, on which the defense motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, the denial of which is the plaint in the fourth assignment of error of appellant's brief.

Issue:

1.     WON witness Crispin Angeles should be impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements- YES

2.     WON the testimony of Padrones should be considered- NO

Held:

1. It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be truthful and perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any adverse conclusion can be made therefrom.

These considerations he at the base of the familiar rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which is essence means simply that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or, for that matter, subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by him that he should be deemed impeached. Thus, Section 16 of Rule 132 provides:

Section 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements if so, to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

In United States vs. Baluyot, the Court made a clear exposition of the universal rule of laying a predicate as follows:

Xxx For instance, if the attorney for -the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court.

If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can.

On the other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible.

This process of cross- examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts 'laying a predicate' for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a

witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or otherwise, made it appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named had made statements in their declarations before the fiscal materially at variance with their statements in court and that the production of said declarations was necessary or even desirable, in the interests of justice, the court would have had ample power to order their production.

But it, as in the instant case of the witness Angeles, the prosecution did not object to the presentation of Exhibit 17 which was offered expressly for impeachment purposes, notwithstanding that the defense did not give the witness the opportunity to give his own explanation of the apparent contradictions in his testimony, the trial judge and the appellate courts have no alternative but to determine, if they can, possible reconciliation on the basis alone of logic and common experience.

The omission to object on the ground of failure to lay the predicate is waived by the omission to interpose the same when the impeaching contradictory statement is offered.

On this score, We find the inconsistencies in the two versions of Angeles utterly beyond possible rational explanation. The various discrepancies We have pointed out above - and there are still others We have not mentioned — are so disparate that there can be no other conclusion than that the witness must have lied in either of them. Accordingly, We have to reject both of them.

2.The testimony of the other witness Miguel Padrones, one of appellant's co-accused, cannot be viewed in better light.

Counsel for accused Relucio started his cross-examination of Padrones by inquiring about the circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention which incontestably took place on October 5, 1972. The witness readily revealed that he was investigated by Viloria regarding the murder of Talastas and he signed that written investigation in the presence of Judge Vicencio but he denied executing this later on. (he cannot remember and what he only remembers is Exh 2-A the statement which Padrones claimed above to have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly signed by him later on Oct 19 befor Judge Del Rosario)

On the basis of such clear and categorical testimony about a statement signed by him before Judge Vicencio of the City Court on that date October 5, 1972, the defense counsel asked "the Honorable District State Prosecutor to produce the written investigation of this witness on October 5, 1972, if he has it in his possession. The District State Prosecutor also denied possession of the affidavit of October 5 of Miguel Padrones. The defense, to strengthen its position, manifested that the affidavit of October 5 was lost and that this could be confirmed by Atty. Fidel Taguiam, counsel of one of the defendants; but Atty. Taguiam was never presented in court to confirm or deny the same. The Court honestly believes that there was no such affidavit ever executed on October 5, 1971 and that the witness might be referring to the affidavits executed by him on October 20, 1971 (Exhibit "2" Relucio) and on December 14, 1972 before the District State Prosecutor.

To further Justify their actuations, the defense called on to the witness stand the former Cabanatuan City Judge Alfin Vicencio, now the presiding judge of one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Masbate. His Honor testified that he remembers one Miguel Padrones to have executed an affidavit before him on October 5, 1971, but that he had only a general Idea of its contents. The defense got what it wanted to get from the lips of His Honor, Judge Alfin Vicencio and i.e., that it was only accused Miguel Padrones who shot and killed the deceased victim Gonzalo Talastas when the latter caught up with him near the Retelco building. As a whole, His Honor wanted this Court to believe that only Miguel Padrones shot and killed Gonzalo Talastas and that his co-accused Federico Relucio and Rosendo Velasco were not with Padrones when he killed said deceased victim.

To this testimony of His Honor, it is regrettable to state that he failed to state at least, all the substantial contents of the said affidavit, assuming that there was really an affidavit of October 5 executed by Miguel Padrones. Human as we all are, it is unavoidable for our minds to slip, particularly as regards the dates, considering the length of time and the work that confronted His Honor, the Honorable Alfin Vicencio.

As can be seen, seemingly there was a deliberate and concerted intent to prevent the impeachment of Padrones, except that the prosecutor failed to realize that with his omission to object to the testimony of Judge Vicencio, all his transparent moves to suppress the presentation of the statement of said witness of October 5, 1972 would come to naught. The record reveals only too plainly that several recesses were allowed by His Honor at critical stages of the cross- examination for the obvious purpose of affording the witness opportunity to adjust his testimony with the help of the prosecutor — that with his being already released after his discharge on January 4, 1972 — so much so that after the spirited skirmishes between defense counsel and the prosecutor when the session of January 4, 1972 was to end, the significance of which could not have been lost to him, at the resumption of the trial on February 12, 1972, the witness tried to sing a different tune. As to be expected, he came out with the theory that the statement given by him before Patrolman Corporal Viloria on October 5, 1972 was actually signed by him on October 19 or 20, 1972 before Fiscal del Rosario.

For the trial court to hold in its decision under review, in the face of this solemn testimony of a fellow member of the judiciary of equal rank, as against the wavering and fast changing declarations of a discharged accused, that "it is regrettable to state that he (Judge Vicencio) failed to state at least the substantial contents of said affidavit, (the statement of Padrones before him of October 5, 1972) assuming that there was really an affidavit of October 5 executed by Miguel Padrones.

Human as we all are, it is unavoidable for our minds to slip particularly as regards the dates, considering the length of time and the work that confronted His Honor, the Honorable Alfin Vicencio" is purely a slanted rationalization and an unexcusable display of uncommon naivety truly unbecoming of a judicial trier of facts. This observation is also justified by His Honor's own admission that:

But it is not all rosy with the testimony of Miguel Padrones. Like all other witnesses of the same capabilities he suffers from a poor memory as regards remembering dates of events and faces of persons whom he occasionally saw and met. The records is replete of incidents showing the poor memory of this witness as regards the exact dates of events and the faces of persons he met. The following instances will show that while in the witness stand he was asked the following: 'Do you remember where were you on June 23, 1971 between the hours of four o'clock and five o'clock in the afternoon?' His answer was: 'I was in the residence of Atty. Perez.' It may be noted that June 23, 1971 was the date of the commission of the crime and the same date was included in the question. But when he was asked again on cross-examination the date of the commission of the crane, he answered that he could not remember but if he would be allowed to refer to this affidavit he could answer the same. It was only when he was allowed to refer to this affidavit that he came to know that the crime was committed on June 23, 1971. Again, he was asked when on October 5 he was arrested, and he answered that he did not know other than that it was after lunch. (Appellant's Brief, p. 107).

In other words, His Honor could excuse the supposed lapse of memory of a discharged accused, while he would condemn a supposedly similar fault in the testimony of a judge.

We hold that, contrary to the unwarranted and incomprehensible finding of His Honor, the evidence on record conclusively establishes that Padrones did give to Patrolman Corporal Viloria of the Cabanatuan City Police on October 5, 1972 immediately after his arrest, his own account of what happened in the afternoon of June 23, 1971 at the Capital Theater and subsequently near the Old Republic Telephone Company in Cabanatuan City that led to the death of Gonzalo Talastas and that he signed and swore to said statement before Judge Alfin Vicencio, then of the City Court of Cabanatuan City, that same day to whom he was brought by the same Patrolman Corporal Viloria.

We consider the attitude shown in the premises by District State Prosecutor Mariano D. Copuyoc of feigning ignorance of Annex A and attempting to foist upon the court the theory that Exhibit 2-A was the one given by Padrones on October 5, 1972, to be lacking in candor to the court and prejudicial to the interests of justice. Likewise, the circumstances under which Exhibit 2-A, the supposed statement of Padrones bearing two dates, October 19 or 20, 1972, and supposedly signed before Fiscal del Rosario, came into being need to be inquired into, there being indications from the circumstances We have found home by the record that it is not of regular origin.

We further hold that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving due course to the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the defense dated April 16, 1974, if only for the purpose of delving deeper into the execution of Annex A thereof, which appears to be the statement given by Padrones on October 5, 1972 to Patrolman Corporal Viloria and which he signed and swore to before Judge Vicencio, wherein Padrones categorically confessed that he, and not appellant Velasco, was the one who chased and shot to death Gonzalo Talastas during the incident here in question.

Indeed, in the light of all the foregoing, We can safely say that with the testimony of Judge Vicencio, the evidence against appellant Velasco

coming from the lips of Padrones is not entitled to any credit at all. And there is even no need for the new trial prayed for by the defense. In the premises, such a proceeding would obviously be superfluous.

- 3-

With the disgusting character of the prosecution's evidence against herein appellant Velasco We have disclosed above, and Our ineludible conclusions against the evidentiary value of the testimonies of Crispin Angeles and the discharged defendant Miguel Padrones, it goes without saying that the charge of murder against said appellant has no leg to stand on. Accordingly, We find no need to elucidate on the other evidence on record, which, to be sure, based on Our careful study thereof could absolve him just the same, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment of conviction of the trial court, for lack of any evidence to support the same.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court under review is hereby reversed and the appellant Rosendo Velasco is acquitted and ordered immediately released from custody unless there is any reason for his further detention other than this case, with the corresponding portion of the costs de officio. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija, for their information and guidance relative to the actuations of Special District Prosecutor Copuyoc and Fiscal del Rosario discussed in the above opinion.