Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members, and Term of Office

DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.

FACTS:

On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).

On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections, in which it stated that its membership includes former members of the AFP, Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens. They filed an Amended Manifestation, and in which they manifest that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration that is still pending. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Partys participation in the Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.

The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that the findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are based on pure speculation. The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo committed mutiny, held innocent civilian personnel as hostage, employed violence and used unlawful means and in the process defied the laws of organized society purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court trying their case, (RTC Makati) has not yet decided the case against them; and the Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to due process of law.

On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.

However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.

HELD: NO

This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition for Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:

ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x x x x x x x

ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

C. The Commission on Elections

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. x x x.

RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:

Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to

the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.

Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

A.  The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.

MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,this Court explained as follows:

The concept of facts of common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men.

The Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence thereon.

B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.

In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.  The Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.

The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.

C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence. This argument cannot be sustained.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable:

An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.  The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that the proposed witness should not appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line with the character and purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed in these cases. They are standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.

Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:

As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.

In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion.

On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of MAGDALO with coup dtat following the events that took place during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds.

This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.

*Issue on Mootness

whether this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it specifically asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections.

xxxxxx

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.