Tuesday, January 23, 2018

People v. Yparraguirre

Facts:
                Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape.
                The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months old.  Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep.  He approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease.  Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the children.
                Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside.  As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the tablets.  A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down.  Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed.  She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck.  He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. 
                Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her.  He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her.  Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her.  After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach.  She lost consciousness.
                A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her private parts.  She wiped the blood and changed her clothes.  Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her parents.  Appellant then left the house.
                Rosita did not say a word about the incident.  She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY.  Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock.  She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself.  In short, Rosita became helpless.  She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. 
                On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk.  She conducted a physical examination and also found that:
-- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."
                Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and treatment.  After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant.
                Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged.  He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market.  Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening.  He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.
                The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.  It also ordered him to indemnify Rosita P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees,

Issues:
WON the court erred in holding Yparraguirre guilty solely on the basis of Rosita’s testimony
NO.
                The appeal has no merit.  After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal.  The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.
                The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not important.  The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her tablets for treatment of the disease.  Appellant's allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative.  There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets.  They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.  The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life.  The complaint was filed three months after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for rape.
                Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout.  She was also the breadwinner of the family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. Rosita suffered psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the spouses actually found her to be a good worker. When Rosita returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric treatment.  Indeed, Rosita's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.
WON the court erred in holding that witness Mary Ann Yparraguirre went to the mother of the accused to negotiate for the dropping of the case.
                NO
                Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint.  When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00).  Still Merlyn refused to accept it.[16] As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife.  Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money.
                An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
                The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime.  The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.








People v. Tia Fong

Facts:

1.     This is an appeal by Tia Fong alias Ah Sam against a judgment  finding the said Ah Sam, Maximo Alcantar, Florencio Bahala and Rufino Palarca guilty of homicide

2.     the Municipal Mayor was informed that a dead body was lying in the coconut plantation and they found the dead body of a Chinaman named Lian Kao, 28 years of age, son of Chinaman Wong Kiat.

3.     The body was found with a belt tied around the neck, and the president of the sanitary division was of the opinion that death was caused by suffocation or by strangulation after the victim had become unconscious.

4.     lieutenant of the Constabulary (Chavez)  conducted the investigation. He suspected Florencio Bahala, who was living in the neighborhood, and subjected him to a rigid questioning. He noticed that his statements did not agree with those of his common-law wife. After some time Chavez succeeded in convincing him, through the help of the wife, to own his part in the crime.

5.     Bahala made a confession. The confession of Maximo Alcantar and Rufino Palarca were also secured. So an information was filed. This was amended and the persons accused were the three above-mentioned who has confessed, and Heracleo Limbaco and the Appellant Tia Fong alias Ah Sam.

6.     Both Limbaco and Ah Sam denied complicity in the crime. At the trial, the other Defendants repudiated the confessions they had made. This notwithstanding, the court found four of them guilty. Heracleo Limbaco was acquitted of the charge. As only Ah Sam has appealed the decision, only such facts as are relevant to the charge against him will be considered.

7.     Sometime before the incident, Ah Sam was in partnership with Wong Kiat and other Chinamen. Ah Sam separated from Wong Kiat and the others and established a store of his own.

8.     A compadre of his testified that at eight o’clock in the evening of February 20, 1950, after he had closed the store and while he was outside, he saw Tia Fong pass by and had occasion to converse with the latter. Ah Sam complained that his business was dying because Wong Kiat, the father of the deceased, and his companions would not sell him bread to sell in his store. Ah Sam after a while said it is better that Wong Kiat and Lian Kaw be whipped.

9.     The evidence mainly relied upon for the conviction of Ah Sam is his silent participation in the reenactment of the crime by his co- accused Florencio Bahala, Maximo Alcantar and Rufino Palarca.

10.   With the confessions of these three accused on hand, Lt. Chavez and a subordinate of his, Sgt. Fernandez, asked the accused to reenact the crime and photography of the acts reenacted were caused to be taken. In all the most important incidents and details of the commission of the crime. Ah Sam took part, although silently, under the direction of the Constabulary and his three co- accused.

a.     In Exhibit “Q” Tia Fong reenacted his position while waiting for his co-accused.
b.     In Exhibit “R” he reenacted his own position when he and his co-accused were talking together planning the commission of the crime.
c.      In Exhibit “S” Ah Sam also reenacted his own position or participation while he and his co-accused were waiting for Erak (Heracleo Limbaco), who had gone out to look for the intended victim and present him to them.
d.     In Exhibit “K” Ah Sam also reenacted his own position in relation to the other accused when Erak accompanied the victim and the other accused followed them - Erak and the victim.
e.     Exhibit “M” represents the positions of all the accused, Ah Sam included, as the victim fell unconscious after he had been assaulted. In this same exhibit, Ah Sam reenacted the part he took in untying the belt of the victim.
f.      In Exhibit “N” Ah Sam played his own part, showing the method in which he strangled the victim.
g.     Exhibit “U” is the photograph of the manner in which Appellant tied the belt which he took from the victim’s waist and with which the latter was strangled, while
h.     Exhibit “W” reenacts the distribution of the money by him to his co-accused.

11.   The witnesses for the prosecution especially Lt. Chavez, testified that Ah Sam took part in the reenactment of the crime and without any opposition on his (Ah Sam’s) part. He (Ah Sam) neither opposed nor denied to take part. On one occasion Ah Sam himself, according to Lt. Chavez, corrected his co-accused as they were reenacting their respective positions as Exhibit “K” was being taken, as witness the following testimony — he said that he was not supposed to be on the right side of the picture but on the extreme left of the road or street.

12.   Ah Sam testified that before the reenactment of the crime he was told before hand to obey whatever instructions Sgt. Fernandez would give, and that he tried his best to obey said instructions.

a.     According to him, Sgt. Fernandez would first read the paper (confession of his co- accused), then direct the accused to assume the positions, and lastly ordered pictures to be taken. Ah Sam further declared that he just followed the directions given by Sgt. Fernandez because he had already been maltreated. The supposed maltreatment consisted in having been boxed in the solar plexus as a result of which he involuntarily urinated.

13.   The trial judge held that the guilt of Ah Sam was proved by his participation in the reenactment of the crime.

14.   His counsel, on this appeal, argues that it was error for the trial court to consider said participation as an evidence against him, because all that the Appellant did during the entire period of the reenactment was to remain silent and do what he was told and directed to do.

15.   Against this contention the Solicitor General argues that the Appellant himself voluntarily took part in the reenactment and in one instance corrected the position which he was directed to take.

Issue: WON his participation in the reenactment is can be used as an evidence against him.

Held:YES
We have carefully reviewed the evidence, especially the testimony of the Appellant on the circumstances leading to his participation in the reenactment, and we find no evidence to sustain the claim that he was forced against his will to participate therein. It is true that Ah Sam stated that he was boxed on the solar plexus, and was later brought to a toilet where he was compelled to put his face in the bowl, but these supposed instances of maltreatment relate to attempts to extract a confession from him, not to compel him to take part in the reenactment of the crime.

 He stated that Sgt. Fernandez had warned him to obey his orders in the reenactment otherwise he would again be subject to maltreatment, but we find nothing to corroborate the making of the supposed threat and Appellant’s willing conduct throughout the reenactment does not evince the supposed threat. We have searched the record in vain for any act or word of protest from Appellant, either before the reenactment or during the entire period thereof, against his taking part therein. Appellant’s counsel himself admits that the Appellant was silent, doing what he was told to do.

But counsel for the Appellant contends that as the Appellant was under arrest at the time of the reenactment, his taking part therein should not be considered as evidence against him.
“SEC. 8. Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration made in the presence and within the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him.”

In one case decided by us, U. S. vs. Bay, 27 Phil., 495, the Defendant was accused before the councilman of a barrio with having criminally assaulted the offended party. The Defendant kept silent as the latter explained the assault, neither admitting nor denying the imputation. At the trial he allege that the imputation was false, but we held that if it were so, he would have instantly and indignantly denied the imputation when made before the councilman.

But in another case, we also said that if a Defendant remains silent during an official investigation by a Fiscal, such silence is no evidence of his guilt, as said official investigation was no occasion for denying the imputation then being made against him (U. S. vs. De la Cruz, 12 Phil., 87).

There are other related principles, in connection with the silence of an accused in criminal cases, namely, that his failure or refusal to testify may not be taken as evidence against him (Rule 111, section 1 [c], and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question E Rule 123, section 79). It has also been held that while an accused is under custody his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise his right of silence would be illusory.

“Section 1259 (d) Silence under Arrest. Some of the courts have held that the fact that one is under arrest and in the custody of an officer, when he is silent under accusation, prevents his silence or the statements themselves from being admissible against him, on the ground that under such circumstances he is not called upon to speak. Other courts have held that this circumstance alone does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of crime calls for reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses so to do .”, (16 C.J. 633.)

“SEC. 574. Accused under Arrest or in custody. — The authorities are divided as to the effect on the admissibility of an incriminating statement made in the presence of an accused, and not denied by him, of the fact that he was under arrest or in custody under a criminal charge at the time the statement was made. According to some decisions, the mere fact of arrest, alone, is not sufficient to render the testimony inadmissible, but such fact deserves consideration only as one of the circumstances under which the accusation was made, in determining whether the accused was afforded an opportunity to deny and whether he was naturally called to do so. Another view supported by many authorities is that the mere fact that an accused was under arrest is sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of the failure of the accused to deny accusatory statements made in his presence and bearing. According to this view, it is common knowledge and belief of men in general that silence while under arrest is most conducive to the welfare of an accused, whether he is guilty or innocent .” (20 Am. Jur. 486.)

But the better rule is to consider the circumstances in each case and decide the admissibility of the silence accordingly.
“(4) Certain situations in particular may furnish a positive motive for silence without regard to the truth or falsity of the statement. Whether the fact that the party is at the time under arrest creates such a situation has been the subject of opposing opinions; a few Courts (for the most part in acceptance of an early Massachusetts precedent), by a rule of thumb exclude the statement invariably; but the better rule is to allow some flexibility according to circumstances:

The reenactment of the crime was not a part of a formal official investigation like one conducted by a justice of the peace or a provincial fiscal. The reenactment was a police contrivance, designed to test the truthfulness of the statements of the witnesses who had confessed the commission of the offense. If the Appellant herein had not really taken part in the commission of the crime, his immediate reaction when he became aware that the crime was to be reenacted, he should have been to protest against the implication of the reenactment or to refuse his indicated participation therein.

One of the accused, Heracleo Limbaco, did not admit participation in the crime. Like the Appellant, he did not confess yet he was not asked to participate in the reenactment. On the other hand the Appellant readily took part therein. If he did own participation in the offense he should have refused, at least in the beginning, to participate in the reenactment or to follow the directions indicated. Far from doing so, he acquiesced and willingly took part in the reenactment as directed. If the Appellant had the courage to refuse to own his guilt when he was boxed on the solar plexus, or when he was forced to put his face in the toilet bowl, why did he not have the courage to protest his participation in the reenactment before or while it was being conducted?

It is to be noted that the implication of guilt in the case at bar is not derived from mere silence; It is inferred from Appellant’s silent acquiescence in participating in the reenactment of the crime. More than mere silence, Appellant committed positive acts without protest or denial when he was free to refuse. Had he not actually participated in the commission of the offense for which he is charged, he would have protested being made to take part in the reenactment thereof; he would have informed the public officials at the time of the reenactment, or immediately prior thereto, that he did not actually take part in the commission of the offense. We, therefore, find that the trial court committed no error in taking into account Appellant’s participation in the reenactment as voluntary and in considering it as evidence against him.

The circumstances or evidence submitted against the Appellant in this case are as follows: he was the only one among the accused who had a motive for causing the death of Lian Kaw; had he not actually participated in the commission of the offense he would have been able to introduced positive evidence that he was either not present or was somewhere else and, therefore, could not have taken part in the said crime; the confession of his co-accused as to the reason for the killing and as to the manner in which the offense was committed corroborates or indicates the probability of the Appellant having participated therein;  and his silent acquiescence in taking part in the reenactment and his voluntary and ready participation therein produce conviction as to his actual participation in the commission of the offense.

The above circumstances convince us that the Appellant Ah Sam participated in the commission of the crime, inducing his co- accused to help him perpetrate it, he himself actually taking direct part therein. We find, therefore, that the trial court committed no error in finding him guilty as charged.


The Solicitor General calls attention to the fact that the crime committed is not mere homicide, but murder. The information charges murder, and the facts found show that the killing of the deceased is attended by one qualifying circumstance, that of evident premeditation.