Jocson v. Robles 22 SCRA 521; February 10,1968

JOCSON v. ROBLES

Topic: Voidable Marriages; Procedure in Annulment; No Confession of Judgment

Nature of the case:

Doctrine:

Civil Code

Art. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

Art 101 (2) In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Facts:

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile 6 Domestic Relations Court an action for the annulment of marriage to Ricardo R. Robles,on the ground that it was bigamous. 

It was alleged in the amended complaint previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the CFI of Manila.

In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage.  But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case.  It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by force and intimidation employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother, dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion. Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage. 

The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary judgment.  Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage.  Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964.  And, when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the action.

Issue:

WON the joint affidavits of the plaintiff’s father and brother constitute a confession of judgment that would merit the annulment of marriage

Ruling:

On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.  The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

Dispositive:

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Pugeda v. Trias 4 SCRA 849

Pugeda v. Trias

Nature of the Case: Motion for Reconsideration

Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence.

Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar Lands Act which at the time of his death were not yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and thereafter the title was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property not conjugal;

(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and

(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion and declared the decision as final.

Ruling:

Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The doctrine in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers made by the husband without the approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made pro indiviso in a project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.

Domalagan v. Bolifer 33 Phil 471; February 8, 1916

Domalagan v. Bolifer

Nature of the Case: Recover of the defendant the sum of P516, together with damages estimated in the sum of P350 and interest, and costs.

Doctrine: If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

Facts: Plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer;

He completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant the said sum of P500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi.

He demanded of the defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and damages; that the damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.

Defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged that the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.

CFI: rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said sum of P516 together with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910.

Issue: WON the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective

Ruling: YES

The appellant contends that a contract, such as the one relied upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing. We have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff, which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract. That part of said section 335 which the appellant relies upon for relief provides:

"In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:

"1.** * "2.** *

"3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry."

Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it.

Said section provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.

If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

Hermosisima v. CA; 109 Phil 629

Hermosisima v. CA

Nature of the Case: Acknowledgment

Doctrine: "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost 10 years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.

One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.

Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.

The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees

CA affirmed this decision.

Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

Ruling: NO

Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".

The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.