Marcos II v. CA 273 SCRA 47

MARCOS II v. CA

Doctrine:

Facts:

Petitioner Bongbong Marcos questions the actuations of the respondent CIR in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate of the will of the late president.

A Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the late president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies".

The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax returns, as well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, -all in violation of the NIRC.

The CIR thereby caused the preparation and filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II for the years 1982 to 1985.

The BIR issued the following:

(1) Deficiency estate tax assessment  against the estate of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00;

(2) Deficiency income tax assessment against the Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and 1986;

(3) Deficiency income tax assessment against petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to 1985.

The CIR avers that copies of the deficiency estate and income tax assessments were all personally and constructively served upon Imelda and Bongbong through their respective caretakers at their last known addresses.

Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative or counsel), to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel - but to no avail.

The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs. Marcos and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service of said assessments.

The BIR Commissioner issued several notices of levy on real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses - to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes.

The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213 of the NIRC.

Notices of sale at public auction were posted at the lobby of the City Hall of Tacloban City. There being no bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the government.

Bongbong filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction."

Contentions:

Petitioner- posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due upon the estate of the deceased.

Domingo v. Garlitos "the ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be effected through any other means.

Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed by the probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this regard, petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:

“where during the pendency of judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for taxes is presented by the government, the court has the authority to order payment by the administrator; but, in the same way that it has authority to order payment or satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the same xxx”

BIR- that the state's authority to collect internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the same.

Claims for payment of estate and income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should be paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to decide whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and limited jurisdiction.

Issues:

(1)   WON the BIR has the authority to collect by the summary remedy of levying upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased

(2)   WON the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and void

(3)   WON respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive.

(4)   WON there was sufficient service of Notices of Assessment to the petitioner,

(5)   WON Notices of Levy must be nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the petitioner.

Ruling:

(1) YES

The Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate.

From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.

On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.

If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.

"Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment.-When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall issue an assessment based on his findings.

Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and unappealable.

If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left by President Marcos.

(2) NO

The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through the summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.

The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of the NIRC, which pertinently provides:

"Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes.- (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.

xxx

(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the tax.

The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three years following the assessment of the tax.

Since the estate tax assessment had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against the assessment should have been pursued following the avenue paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue taxes.

(3) NO

Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases questioning the late president's ownership or interests in several properties make the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this time.

Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the properties levied upon by the BIR in the collection of estate taxes upon the decedent's estate were among those involved in the said cases pending in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these cases are relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the decedent has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate.

It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the BIR whose determinations and assessments are presumed correct and made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty of proving otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed.

In this instance, petitioner has not pointed out one single provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to the questioned assessment, which bears a trace of falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's attack on the assessment bears mainly on the alleged improbable and unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the assessments made.

Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised, considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of grave abuse of discretion.

The subject tax assessments having become final, executory and enforceable, the same can no longer be contested by means of a disguised protest. In the main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or remedy.

(4) YES

We find, after considering the facts and circumstances, as well as evidences, that there was sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments, levy and sale, sent to Bongbong as well as to his mother.

Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the caretakers, the subsequent notices given thereafter could no longer be ignored as they were sent at a time when petitioner was already here in the Philippines, and at a place where said notices would surely be called to petitioner's attention, and received by responsible persons of sufficient age and discretion.

Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Q.C Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a conference relative to her tax liabilities, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos - Dean Antonio Coronel

There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother) and it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite several opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, - the tax assessments subject of this case, upon which the levy and sale of properties were based, could no longer be contested (directly or indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari."

(5) NO

Petitioner argues that as a mandatory heir of the decedent, he has an interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties should have been served upon him.

We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent, and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased. In the same vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late president and his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows that service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax delinquencies upon the petitioner is not required by law, as under

Section 213 of the NIRC, which pertinently states:

"xxx

...Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the property in question.

xxx"

The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7, 1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his office at the Batasang Pambansa.

San Agustin v. CIR GR No. 138485

SAN AGUSTIN v. CIR

Doctrine:

Facts:

Atty. Jose San Agustin leaving his wife Dra. Felisa L. San Agustin as sole heir. He left a holographic will giving all his estate to his widow, and naming retired Justice Jose Y. Feria as Executor thereof.

Probate proceedings were instituted. Pursuantly, notice of decedent's death was sent to the CIR on August 30, 1990.

An estate tax return reporting an estate tax due of P1,676,432.00 was filed on behalf of the estate, with a request for an extension of two years for the payment of the tax, inasmuch as the decedent's widow (did) not personally have sufficient funds, and that the payment (would) have to come from the estate.

BIR Deputy Commissioner granted the heirs an extension of only six (6) months, subject to the imposition of penalties and interests under Sections 248 and 249 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

The RTC allowed the will and appointed Jose Feria as Executor of the estate. The executor submitted to the probate court an inventory of the estate with a motion for authority to withdraw funds for the payment of the estate tax. Such authority was granted by the probate court.

Thereafter, the executor paid the estate tax in the amount of P1,676,432 as reported in the Tax Return filed with the BIR. This was well within the six (6) months extension period granted by the BIR.

Felisa received a Pre-Assessment Notice from the BIR, dated August 29, 1991, showing a deficiency estate tax of P538,509.50, which, including surcharge, interest and penalties, amounted to P976,540.00.

On October 1, 1991, within the ten-day period given in the pre- assessment notice, the executor filed a letter with the petitioner Commissioner expressing readiness to pay the basic deficiency estate tax of P538,509.50 as soon as the Regional Trial Court approves withdrawal thereof, but, requesting that the surcharge, interest, and other penalties, amounting to P438,040.38 be waived, considering that the assessed deficiency arose only on account of the difference in zonal valuation used by the Estate and the BIR, and that the estate tax due per return of P1,676,432.00 was already paid in due time within the extension period.

The Commissioner accepted payment of the basic deficiency tax in the amount of P538,509.50 through its Receivable Accounts Billing Division.

The request for reconsideration was not acted upon until January 21, 1993, when the executor received a letter, dated September 21, 1992, signed by the Commissioner, stating that there is no legal justification for the waiver of the interests, surcharge and compromise penalty in this case, and requiring full payment of P438,040.38 representing such charges within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

In view thereof, the respondent estate paid the amount of P438,040.38 under protest on January 25, 1993.

On February 18, 1993, a Petition for Review was filed by the executor with the CTA with the prayer that the Commissioner's letter/decision, dated September 21, 1992 be reversed and that a refund of the amount of P438,040.38 be ordered.

The Commissioner opposed the said petition, alleging that the CTA's jurisdiction was not properly invoked inasmuch as no claim for a tax refund of the deficiency tax collected was filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue before the petition was filed, in violation of Sections 204 and 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, there is no statutory basis for the refund of the deficiency surcharges, interests and penalties charged by the Commissioner upon the estate of the decedent.

The CTA modified the CIR's assessment for surcharge, interests and other penalties from P438,040.38 to P13,462.74, representing interest on the deficiency estate tax, for which reason the CTA ordered the reimbursement to the respondent estate the balance of P423,577.64

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals was appealed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and held that the Court of Tax Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and that, accordingly, its decision was null and void.

Issues:

1. The filing of a claim for refund [is] not essential before the filing of the petition for review.

2. The imposition by the respondent of surcharge, interest and penalties on the deficiency estate tax is not in accord with the law and therefore illegal.

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition partly meritorious.

The case has a striking resemblance to the controversy in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cebu vs. Collector of Internal Revenue. The petitioner in that case paid under protest the sum of P5,201.52 by way of income tax, surcharge and interest and, forthwith, filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals. Then respondent Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue set up several defenses, one of which was that petitioner had failed to first file a written claim for refund, pursuant to Section 306 of the Tax Code, of the amounts paid. Convinced that the lack of a written claim for refund was fatal to petitioner's recourse to it, the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal to this Court, the tax court's ruling was reversed; the Court held:

It would appear that, as early as 23 September 1991, the estate already received a pre-assessment notice indicating a deficiency estate tax of P538,509.50. Within the ten-day period given in the pre-assessment notice, respondent Commissioner received a letter from petitioner expressing the latter's readiness to pay the basic deficiency estate tax of P538,509.50 as soon as the trial court would have approved the withdrawal of that sum from the estate but requesting that the surcharge, interests and penalties be waived. On 04 October 1991, however, petitioner received from the Commissioner notice insisting payment of the tax due on or before the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. The deficiency estate tax of P538,509.50 was not paid until 19 December

1991.

The delay in the payment of the deficiency tax within the time prescribed for its payment in the notice of assessment justifies the imposition of a 25% surcharge in consonance with Section 248A(3) of the Tax Code. The basic deficiency tax in this case being P538,509.50, the twenty-five percent thereof comes to P134,627.37. Section 249 of the Tax Code states that any deficiency in the tax due would be subject to interest at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum, which interest shall be assessed and collected from the date prescribed for its payment until full payment is made.

In sum, the tax liability of the estate includes a surcharge of P134,627.37 and interest of P13,462.74 or a total of P148,090.00.

The deficiency assessment for surcharge, interest and penalties is modified and recomputed to be in the amount of P148,090.00 surcharge of P134,627.37 and interest of P13,462.74. Petitioner estate having since paid the sum of P438,040.38, respondent Commissioner is hereby ordered to refund to the Estate of Jose San Agustin the overpaid amount of P289,950.38.

Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members, and Term of Office

DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.

FACTS:

On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).

On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections, in which it stated that its membership includes former members of the AFP, Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens. They filed an Amended Manifestation, and in which they manifest that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration that is still pending. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Partys participation in the Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.

The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that the findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are based on pure speculation. The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo committed mutiny, held innocent civilian personnel as hostage, employed violence and used unlawful means and in the process defied the laws of organized society purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court trying their case, (RTC Makati) has not yet decided the case against them; and the Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to due process of law.

On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.

However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.

HELD: NO

This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition for Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:

ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x x x x x x x

ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

C. The Commission on Elections

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. x x x.

RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:

Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to

the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.

Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

A.  The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.

MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,this Court explained as follows:

The concept of facts of common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men.

The Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence thereon.

B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.

In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.  The Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.

The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.

C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence. This argument cannot be sustained.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable:

An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.  The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that the proposed witness should not appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line with the character and purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed in these cases. They are standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.

Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:

As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.

In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion.

On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of MAGDALO with coup dtat following the events that took place during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds.

This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.

*Issue on Mootness

whether this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it specifically asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections.

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The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.

Republic v. Li Ching Chung

Republic v. Li Ching Chung

G.R. No. 197450

TOPIC: Naturalization Proceedings

DOCTRINE: The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

FACTS:

On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention to Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. Almost seven months after filing his declaration of intention, respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before the RTC.

On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his Amended Petition for Naturalization, wherein he alleged that he was born in China, which granted the same privilege of naturalization to Filipinos; that he came to the Philippines on March 15, 1988; that on November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze Mei Ngar, a British national, with whom he had 4 children, all born in Manila; that he had been continuously and permanently residing in the country since his arrival and is currently a resident of Manila with prior residence in Malabon; that he could speak and write in English and Tagalog; that he was entitled to the benefit of Sec 3 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473 reducing to 5 years the requirement under Sec 2 of ten years of continuous residence, because he knew English and Filipino having obtained his education in Manila; and that he had successfully established a trading general merchandise business. He attached several documentary evidence in support of his application.

The petition was set for initial hearing on April 3, 2009 and its notice was posted in a conspicuous place at the Manila City Hall and was published in the Official Gazette and in the Manila Times.

Thereafter, respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting praying that the hearing be moved from April 3, 2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could acquire real estate properties.

The OSG filed its Opposition, arguing that the said motion for early setting was a "clear violation of Sec 1, RA 530, which provides that hearing on the petition should be held not earlier than 6 months from the date of last publication of the notice." The last publication in the newspaper of general circulation was on June 13, 2008, the earliest setting could only be scheduled 6 months later or on December 15, 2008.

The RTC granted respondent’s application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen. And CA affirmed. The CA held that although the petition for naturalization was filed less than 1 year from the time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this defect was not fatal.

The OSG argues that "the petition for naturalization should not be granted in view of its patent jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it was filed within the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is indispensable to the validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition; and 3) respondent’s failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements set under CA 473." In particular, the OSG points out that the publication and posting requirements were not strictly followed, specifically citing that: "(a) the hearing of the petition on 15 December 2008 was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing on 3 April 2009; (b) the order moving the date of hearing (Order dated 31 July 2008) was not published; and, (c) the petition was heard within six (6) months (15 December 2008) from the last publication (on 14 July 2008).

ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino citizen despite his undisputed failure to comply with the requirements provided for in CA No. 473, as amended – which are mandatory and jurisdictional in character – particularly: (i) the filing of his petition for naturalization within the one (1) year proscribed period from the date he filed his declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen; (ii) the failure to attach to the petition his certificate of arrival; and (iii) the failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements prescribed by CA No. 473.

HELD: No

Section 5 of CA No. 473,47 as amended,48 expressly states:

Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice (now Office of the Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself. (Emphasis supplied)

As held in Tan v. Republic, "the period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his petition." The period is designed to give the government ample time to screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and to measure the latter’s good intention and sincerity of purpose. Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the true intentions of those who seek Philippine citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those who are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly come to love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine partners in nation building.

The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.

Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals that would excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding, respondent’s premature filing of his petition for naturalization before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.

In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-118905 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila, is DISMISSED, without prejudice.