Catuira v. CA 236 SCRA 398 (1994)

Catuira v. CA

236 SCRA 398 (1994)

Facts:

1.     2 Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira for having issued 2 checks in payment of her obligation to private complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to cover the same, which checks upon presentment for payment were dishonored by the drawee bank

2.     After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence)

a.      contended that the testimony of Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify

b.     even if the testimony of Ocampo was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.

3.     TC: Denied MTD. Denied MR

4.     Petitioner elevated her case to the CA through a petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus.- Denied

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals erred when it accepted the testimony of private respondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not offered at the time she was called to testify

Held: No

Petitioner contended that the testimony should have been stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which prohibits the court from considering evidence which has not been formally offered; Also it was error for respondent appellate court to declare that her objection was not done at the proper time since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the admissibility of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time such testimony is presented xxx

The petition is devoid of merit. While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court:

While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence the testimony of the complaining witness upon calling her to testify and that it was only after her testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be stricken that the offer was made, the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing the case against the petitioner on the ground invoked. For, she should have objected to the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first offered upon calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already finished testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And for her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was waived.

If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice being served, her actuations should have been otherwise. Instead, she attempted to capitalize on a mere technicality to have the estafa case against her dismissed.

But even assuming that petitioner’s objection was timely, it was at best pointless and superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that the testimony of complaining witness is relevant and material in the criminal prosecution of petitioner for estafa.

Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made by the prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to be expunged from the record.

On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be admitted if only to satisfy the court’s sense of justice and fairness and to stress that substantial justice may not be denied merely on the ground of technicality.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the order of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 35, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss (by way of demurrer to evidence) is AFFIRMED.

People v. Yatco 97 Phil 940 (1955)

People v. Yatco
97 Phil 940 (1955)

Facts:

1.     Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos

2.     During the progress of the trial on while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban.

3.     The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants  Consunji and Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.

4.     Court: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law. MR denied.

5.     This petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Sol Gen, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Consunji and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

Issue:

WON the lower court erred when it ordered the complete exclusion of the confession made by Consunji

Held: Yes

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

"SEC. 14. Confession.·The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him."

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec, 12 of Rule 123, providing that:

"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motuproprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions xxx

After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co.

“In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.”

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

Dispositive:

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial