People v. Yatco
97 Phil 940 (1955)
97 Phil 940 (1955)
Facts:
1.
Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still
unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose
Ramos
2.
During the progress of the trial on while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection
with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before
him) by defendant Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground
that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban.
3.
The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but
on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted
to introduce the confessions of defendants
Consunji and Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior
proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances.
4.
Court: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the
Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru
a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law.
MR denied.
5.
This petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the Sol
Gen, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely
excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Consunji
and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
Issue:
WON the lower court erred when it ordered the complete
exclusion of the confession made by Consunji
Held: Yes
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as
to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and
voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
"SEC. 14. Confession.·The declaration of an
accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense
charged, may be given in evidence against him."
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence,
even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused
Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of
Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its
exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec, 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the
coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its
existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the
confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence
against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in
tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty.
Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less
formally offered in evidence
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of
the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed
by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the
Court issued motuproprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to
object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and
the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
We see no need for the present to discuss the question
of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions xxx
After all, the confessions are not before us and have
not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say
that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in
evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same
conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a
chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to
prove the charges.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of
this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co.
“In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a
judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof,
to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where
there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.”
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in
criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which
the People can no longer appeal.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the
accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the
Court below is directed to proceed with the trial
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