Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves 632 SCRA 236 (2010)

Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves

632 SCRA 236 (2010)

Facts:

1.     The subj property in this case is Lot 382 which was adjudicated to Benedicta Saves, Escolastico Saves, Romana Saves, Rafaela Saves, Januaria Saves and Maximo Saves (1/6 each)

2.     The heirs of Januaria, sold their 1/6 share in to a certain Gaudencia Valencia evidenced by a public instrument.

3.     Benedicta and the heir of Maximo also sold their share to Gaudencia. (2/6)-deed of absolute sale

4.     The heirs of Romana, Rafaela, and Escolastico also sold their respective shares to Gaudencia. (3/6). –deed of sale

5.      Considering that all the 1/6 share, rights, and participation of each co-owner in Lot No. 382 were already sold to Gaudencia Valencia, she initiated the titling of the said property under her name in a Motion for Issuance of TCT. TCT was issued in her name.

6.     Gaudencia Valencia sold the entire property to Enriqueta Chavez Abella, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 was issued.

7.     Meleriana Saves, wrote her relatives, the herein appellees, asking them to verify from the RD information pertaining to Lot 382, as they were among the heirs entitled to said property.

8.     A case for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages was filed by plaintiffs-appellees, alleging that Lot No. 382 was fraudulently acquired by Gaudencia Valencia, and that Gaudencia Valencia fictitiously sold the lot to her grandchild Enriqueta Chaves Abella. However, the complaint was amended twice by plaintiffs considering that the original plaintiffs and defendants were all deceased.

9.     TC: in favor of the petitioners;

a.     Deed of Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio; and being derived from a polluted source, whatever documents Gaudencia Valencia executed in favor of defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella in suffers the same legal infirmity that of a total nullity;

b.     Ordering defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to convey and deliver unto the plaintiffs their shares of Lot No. 382,

10.   CA: reversed

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals can consider evidence not formally offered in the trial court as basis for the herein assailed Court of Appeals ruling

Held: Yes

Petitioners draw attention to the fact that respondents did not formally offer Exhibits "7," "8" and "13" at the trial court proceedings.

In accordance with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the trial court did not consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals allegedly utilized the same as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial court's decision.

It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence.

On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

However, in People v. Napat-a, citing People v. Mate, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

In the case at bar, the records would show that the above requisites have been satisfactorily complied with respect to Exhibit "7." With regard to Exhibit "7," which is a document entitled "Motion for the Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title" filed by Gaudencia Valencia in the same trial court that led to the issuance TCT No. 148, the records would show that it is the same document that petitioners' witness Fruto Rosario identified in his March 5, 1984 testimony and marked as petitioner-plaintiffs' Exhibit "I."

Verily, Exhibit "7" was incorporated and made part of the records of this case as a common exhibit of the parties. That only plaintiffs were able to formally offer the said motion as Exhibit "I" most certainly does not mean that it can only be considered by the courts for the evidentiary purpose offered by plaintiffs. It is well within the discretion of the courts to determine whether an exhibit indeed serves the probative purpose for which it is offered.

Likewise, Exhibit "13," which is TCT No. 110 or the Torrens title that was issued to respondent Emriqueta Abella after she bought Lot No. 382 from Valencia, complies with the requirements enunciated in Napat-a and Mate.

The records of the case bear out that Exhibit "13" was identified by respondent Abella during the continuation of her direct examination on March 15, 1988. This much was noted even by the trial court in its Decision.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that Exhibit "13" was included in the records that was elevated to the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Court of Appeals correctly noted Abella's testimony regarding this document in resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

It is likewise worth emphasizing that under the Revised Rules on Evidence, an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof xxx

The existence of Exhibit "13" was not only known to petitioners but it was expressly alleged in their Appellees' Brief filed with the Court of Appeals and their Petition for Review filed with this Court that Lot No. 382 is registered in the name of respondent Abella.

Indeed, petitioners did not merely acknowledge the existence of TCT No. 110 (respondents' Exhibit "13"), but in fact relied upon it in order to put forward their main theory that the sale from Valencia to respondent Abella is fictitious or void because, according to petitioners, it appears from the said title that respondent Abella was supposedly only nine years old at the time of the transaction. Verily, it is inconsistent for petitioners to claim that Exhibit "13" proves its theory and in the same breath assail it as inadmissible.

Lastly, petitioners' present objection to Exhibit "8" hardly deserves any credit. Exhibit "8" is a rather innocuous document which has no bearing on any of the significant issues in this case.

*other issues:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that respondent Abella is a purchaser in bad faith

Petitioner insists that "for failing to exercise prudent (sic) and caution in buying the property in question," respondent Abella is a buyer in bad faith. She did not investigate closely the basis of the ownership of Gaudencia Valencia, her grandmother, over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good faith should have done under the circumstances.

Petitioners' original theory of the case is that the sale by Gaudencia Valencia to Enriquita Chaves-Abella was fictitious because the latter was only nine years old at the time of the sale. However, during trial, it was clearly established by common evidence that Enriquita was already married to Charles Abella when she bought the lot in 1961, and, as a matter of fact, the purchase money was provided by her husband, Charles. Confronted with the above situation which completely destroyed their theory of the case, petitioners switched from their "fictitious sale to a 9-year old" theory to an entirely different theory, to wit: that Enriquita Chaves-Abella is a purchaser in bad faith.

It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the certificates of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the certificates.

whether or not petitioners, in the remote possibility that they are co-owners of Lot No. 382, are barred from asserting their claims over the same because of estoppel by laches

In the case at bar, plaintiffs, assuming that they or their predecessors-in-interest had rights over the land in question, obviously neglected to exercise these rights by failing to assert any adverse claim over the property or demand any share of its fruits for many years.