Interpacific Transit Inc. v. Aviles 186 SCRA 385 (1990)

Interpacific Transit Inc. v. Aviles
186 SCRA 385 (1990)

Facts:

1.     In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private respondents herein, it was alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, they collected from its various clients payments for airway bills in the amount of P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully converted to their own personal use and benefit.

2.     At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting. This was done in the course of the direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses.

3.     The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court allowed the marking of the said documents.

4.     The prosecution never did submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.

5.     RTC: Acquitted the accused; rejected the agency theory of the prosecution and held that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor and debtor only.

a.     The court also held that the certified photocopies of the airway bills were not admissible under the rule that there can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry other than the original writing itself. Loss of the originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of the prosecution witnesses had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega.

6.     Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be the subject of an appeal under the double jeopardy rule. However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the evidence of the airways bills should not have been rejected and that it had sufficiently established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it.

7.     CA: Affirmed; Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to present evidence of payment of an obligation which was not shown to exist.

Issue:

WON the certified photocopies of the airway bills should have been considered to prove the civil liability of the private respondents.

Held: Yes

There is no question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and neither were the other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the respondent court disregarded an equally important principle long observed in our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.

This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature.

It is instructive at this point to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all.

Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.

In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills

were objected to by the private respondents as secondary evidence only when they were being identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later. It is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequently admitted by the trial court.

The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bills while they were being identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it should have made when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.

And it is no argument to say that the earlier objection should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision obviously refers to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence.

It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution. The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.

(It) is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is presented and accepted without any objection on the part of the other party, the latter is bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it the probatory value it deserves.

We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the photocopies of the airway bills to prove the liability of the private respondents to the petitioner. While we may agree that there was really no criminal liability that could attach to them because they had no fiduciary relationship with ITI, the rejected evidence sufficiently established their indebtedness to the petitioner.

With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we find that there is concrete proof of the defendant’s accountability. More than this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private respondents that the said airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs corresponding to payments allegedly made by the accused to the ITI, and we find this insufficient.

As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation. He did not produce any receipt of such payment. He said that the cancelled payment checks had been lost and relied merely on the check stubs, which are self-serving. The prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for reconsideration that the accused could have easily secured a certification from the bank that the checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No such certification was presented. In short, the private respondents failed to establish their allegation that payment for the airway bills delivered to them had been duly remitted to ITI.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered ORDERING the private respondents to pay to the petitioner the sum of P204,030.66, with 6% interest