Lamagan v. Dela
Cruz
40 SCRA 101 (1971)
Facts:
1.
A complaint for ejectment was
filed by respondent Follosco against petitioner Toribia Lamagan and her husband
Ambrosio Leonor (now deceased)
2.
Follosco prayed of the lower court that it order petitioner to vacate
the 48-hectare portion of his land "illegally occupied" by them and
to restore possession thereof to him. The disputed portion of land is part of
several lots totaling over 500 hectares, of which Follosco is the registered
owner by virtue of an OCT.
3.
Petitioner claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in
open and adverse possession of the property since 1890; that Follosco's title
was acquired through fraud and deceit, and that the land should be deemed held
in trust by Follosco for them; and that the suit was brought by Follosco
"only after many years since he obtained his title thereto to hide from
defendants' knowledge that the latter's land was in fact covered by
(Follosco's) title". As counterclaim, defendants prayed for the
reconveyance of the disputed land to them on the theory that the same should be
deemed as held in trust by Follosco for them.
4.
Follosco presented through counsel his evidence, oral and documentary,
and closed his case. Petitioner then presented as their first witness
petitioner's late husband in support of their defense and counterclaim for
reconveyance.
5.
In the course of his direct examination by petitioner's counsel, Follosco's
counsel objected to a question dealing with the ownership of the land and
manifested a continuing objection to all similar questions which would elicit
evidence of alleged ownership of defendants, on the ground that Follosco's
title was already indefeasible and beyond judicial review.
6.
LC: any claims of defendants based on an alleged pre-existing right
prior to the alleged fraudulent issuance of the title in favor of Follosco was
already barred under section 38 of Act 496 and that since no petition to reopen
and review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud had been filed
within one year from issuance of the decree, Follosco's title had become
indefeasible and could no longer be attacked collaterally.
7.
The court so resolves that all questions tending to elicit proof of
ownership other than those which will prove a better and earlier issued Torrens
Title duly registered in favor of the defendants or any of the defendants shall
be barred and be not heard" and sustained Follosco's objection to petitioner’s
line of questioning, holding that " (T)his court, without attempting to
decide the case at its present stage, will, therefore, entertain from the
defendants proofs and evidence which will indomitably (sic) show a better and
earlier Torrens Title issued to the defendants, if there is any."
8.
Petitioner claims that the effect of respondent court's questioned
resolution was to totally prevent her from adducing at the trial any further
evidence in support of her defense to the action for ejectment and of her
counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed land, such as her documentary
evidence
a. possessory information title in
the name of one Mariano Lamagan(1891)
b. deed of sale by Mariano Lamagan
in favor of Nicolas Cambiado
c. deed of sale by Nicolas Cambiado
in favor of Leoncio Lamaga
d. tax declarations
9.
MR denied. Petitioner filed pet for certiorari with CA. Denied
Issue:
did the appellate court commit any grave error,
correctible by certiorari, in
refusing to review on certiorari the trial court's disputed ruling in the case
below rejecting petitioner's contested evidence and dismissing the petition
filed for the purpose, on the principal ground that such ruling is an
interlocutory matter and any question as to the correctness thereof does not
fall "within the ambit of a writ of certiorari" and may only be
reviewed on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits of the case.
Held:No
The appellate court's dismissal of the petition was in
full accord with the rules and applicable jurisprudence of the Court and must
be affirmed.
As petitioner-appellant concedes in her petition and
brief, it is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural
questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory
in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on
certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal
properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of
the case.
Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari;
errors of judgment, only by appeal. Let us not lose sight of the true function
of the writ of certiorari - 'to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.' And, abuse of discretion must be so grave
and patent to justify the issuance of the writ."
The Court likewise cited therein the exceptional case
where certiorari had been entertained despite the existence of the remedy of an
appeal: "But in those cases, either public welfare and the advancement of
public policy so dictate, or the broader interests of justice so require, or
the order complained of were found to be completely null and void, or appeal
was not considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from orders of
preliminary attachment or appointment of receiver" Thus, in People vs.
Abalos, the Court granted as an exception a writ of certiorari against the
trial court's ruling rejecting rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, pointing
out that "once the accused has been acquitted, there is no means to secure
a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action of the lower court may
have been." No equally compelling reason has been advanced by petitioner
as would place her case within the exceptions.
Assuming that the trial court erred in rejecting
petitioner's proferred evidence, petitioner's recourse is clear under the long
established rules, to wit, to make a formal offer of the evidence under Rule
132, section 35, stating on the record what a party or witness would have
testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as attaching to the
record any rejected exhibits. The Court has long noted that "it is the
better practice to untie with the record exhibits ... which have been
rejected" and that such rejected or excluded exhibits "should have
been permitted by the judge a quo to be attached to the record even if not
admitted in evidence, so that in case of an appeal .... the court ad quem may
thus be able to examine said exhibits and to judge whether or not their
rejection was erroneous."
The validity of the cited rule, i.e. to bring up to
the appellate court the rejected exhibits upon a proper appeal from a decision
on the merits of the case, enabling the appellate court to examine all the
exhibits and evidence of record and judge accordingly whether the trial court
erred in rejecting the excluded exhibits was evident in the very case at bar.
Here, petitioner sought to attach to the records here the exhibits which she
intended to present to the trial court but were ruled out by it. Since there
has been no decision rendered as yet by the trial court and respondent has
denounced theproferred documents as "gross and careless forgery"
which should be passed upon by the trial court in the first instance, the Court
had to order said documents expunged from the records of the case at bar.
Again, respondent has cited the 1953 case of Follosco
vs. Director of Lands, wherein the appeal of petitioner Lamagan and her other
co-appellants (as homestead claimants) from the lower court's order denying
their petition to set aside its judgment of August 27,1948 declaring respondent
Follosco the owner of the land subject of the registration proceeding was
turned down by this Court. This fact places in grave doubt the veracity of
petitioner's allegation that Follosco had sought to hide from her the fact of
his having secured title to the land in question, and appears to provide ample
justification for the appellate court's pronouncement in its August 2, 1967
resolution as to her counterclaim for reconveyance having "already
prescribed."
At any rate, all these questions will have first to be
necessarily passed upon and resolved by the trial court in the decision that it
has yet to render – which serves but to demonstrate the impropriety and
prematurity of petitioner's present action.
In the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance
Co.
-
courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received
with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to
its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be
avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with
certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no
indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later."
-
In other words, where there is no indication of bad faith on the part
of the party offering the evidence or of a design to unduly prolong the trial,
the Court has counselled trial courts to be liberal in accepting proferred
evidence, since even if they were to refuse to accept the evidence, the
affected party should nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded evidence
on the record, for review on appeal
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