Dizon v. CTA G.R. No. 140944; 30 April 2008

Dizon v. CTA

G.R. No. 140944, 30 April 2008

Facts:

1.     Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of his will was filed.

2.     The probate court then appointed retired  Justice Dizon and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon as Special and Assistant Special Administrator.

3.     Justice Dizon informed respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the special proceedings for the Estate.

4.     Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required estate tax return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the estate, as well as the claims against it, had yet to be collated, determined and identified.

5.     Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of the Estate the required estate tax return and to represent the same in securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance.

6.     Atty. Gonzales wrote a letter addressed to the BIR Regional Director and filed the estate tax return with the same BIR Regional Office, showing therein a NIL estate tax liability.

7.     BIR Regional Director issued Certification stating that the taxes due on the transfer of real and personal properties of Jose had been fully paid and said properties may be transferred to his heirs.

8.     Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors. However, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection of the BIR, issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax.

9.     Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration of the said estate tax assessment but the BIR Commissioner denied the request. So petitioner filed a petition for review before the CTA.

10.    During the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial evidence but merely documentary evidence consisting of the following:

a.     Letter to CIR informing them of the probate proceedings

b.     Petition for probate of will and issuance of letter of administration

c.      Inventory

d.     Several claims against the estate

e.     Estate tax return

f.      Certification of Payment of Taxes

11.   Respondent's [BIR] counsel presented one witness in the person of Alberto Enriquez, who was one of the revenue examiners who conducted the investigation on the estate tax case of Jose. In the course of the direct examination of the witness, he identified the following:

a.     Estate tax return prep by BIR

b.     Demand Letter

c.      Assessment Notice

d.     Etc…..

12.   CTA: denied pet. For review Citing this Court's ruling in Vda. de Oñate v. Court of Appeals, the CTA opined that the aforementioned pieces of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence.

a.      Although the above-mentioned documents were not formally offered as evidence for respondent, considering that respondent has been declared to have waived the presentation thereof during the hearing on March 20, 1996, still they could be considered as evidence for respondent since they were properly identified during the presentation of respondent's witness, whose testimony was duly recorded as part of the records of this case. Besides, the documents marked as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records of the case.

b.     the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR and it came up with its own computation of the deficiency estate tax.= P 37,419,493.7

13.   Petitioner filed a pet. For review with the CA. CA: Affirmed CTA; the petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return with the BIR and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or re-assess the said return filed on behalf of the Estate. MR denied

Issue:

WON the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the BIR

Contentions:

Petitioner- claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against the Estate are in excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that the lack of a formal offer of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oñate has already been abandoned in a long line of cases in which the Court held that evidence not formally offered is without any weight or value; that Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence requiring a formal offer of evidence is mandatory in character; that, while BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his testimony before the CTA identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such that the same were marked, BIR's failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Alberto, render the same inadmissible in evidence; that assuming arguendo that the ruling in Vda. de Oñate is still applicable, BIR failed to comply with the doctrine's requisites because the documents herein remained simply part of the BIR records and were not duly incorporated in the court records

Respondent- counters that the documents, being part of the records of the case and duly identified in a duly recorded testimony are considered evidence even if the same were not formally offered;

Held: Yes

No evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA.

The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oñate, which reiterated this Court's previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate on the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of which were decided after Vda. de Oñate, we held that courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered, nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oñate has already been abandoned.

Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon, this Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no error when he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the same were not formally offered.

Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oñate still subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oñate, we held that:

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Xxx

However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oñate is merely an exception to the general rule. Being an exception, it may be applied only when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.

In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence in his direct testimony. He was also subjected to cross-examination and re-cross examination by petitioner. But Alberto's account and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be summoned totestify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer questions relative to the working papers. The lead examiner never testified. Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case.

A common fact threads through Vda. de Oñate and Ramos that does not exist at all in the instant case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were marked at the pre-trial proceedings to warrant the pronouncement that the same were duly incorporated in the records of the case. Thus, we held in Ramos:

In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied.

The exhibits in question were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by respondents' counsel...

While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.

Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence[48] in the

hearing of February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear.[49] The CTA denied petitioner's motion to consider BIR's presentation of evidence as waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation would be considered waived if BIR's evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again, in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel

failed to appear.[50] Thus, in its Resolution[51] dated March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have waived presentation of its evidence. In the same Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR failed to

do so.[52] In all of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha:[53]

A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."

Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice.

*other issue:

It is admitted that the claims of the Estate's aforementioned creditors have been condoned. Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section 79 of the NIRC which provides for the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent.

The specific question is whether the actual claims of the aforementioned creditors may be fully allowed as deductions from the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements entered into by the Estate with its creditors.

We express our agreement with the date-of-death valuation rule. Xxx the claims existing at the time of death are significant to, and should be made the basis of, the determination of allowable deductions.