People v Gaddi
Facts:
1.
Nerio Gaddi was charged with the murder of Augusto Esguerra
a. With intent to kill, without any
justifiable cause, qualified with treachery and with evident
pre-meditation
b. Stabbing him several times with a
knife, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death
2.
Arraignment: pleaded not guilty
3.
Prosecution presented 5 witnesses Ernesto Guzman, Pat, Arturo Angeles,
Cpl. Rogello Castillo, Pat. Jesus Patriarca and Dr. Gregorio C. Blanco. On the
other hand, the accused Gaddi was the sole witness presented for the defense.
4.
Prosecution version of facts:
a. At about 5:00pm in Novaliches QC,
Ernesto Guzman saw Nerio and the victim Augusto drinking gin.
b. In the morning of the following
day, Nerio told Ernesto that he killed his drinking partner Augusto and dumped
his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police.
After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what appellant told him
c. At around 2:00 pm of the same day,
Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo Salamat arrested appellant at
Manrey Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.
d. Appellant told Corporal Castillo
that he killed the victim and where he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus
Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman and Barangay residents
to where the body was in a toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman.
e. The policeman, with the help of
the Barangay residents, dug out the body. The body of the victim was Identified
by Ernesto Guzman, his wife, and Jose Esguerra, victim's brother. Pat.
Patriarca took pictures of the body (Exhibits C to C-5), noted the statements
of Ernesto Guzman and Jose Esguerra, (Exhibit D), and took down the confession
of appellant (Exhibit F). Later, the cadaver was subjected to autopsy
f. A man's T-shirt with collar,
colored yellow, red and blue, and red shorts, were recovered from the pit where
the body of the victim was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were Identified by
Ernesto Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with the victim
on December 11, 1981. A small table, rubber slipper, bottle of wine and glass
were likewise recovered from the same pit.
5.
Defense's version of the facts:
a. Accused Nerio testified that on December 11, 1981, at around 2:00 to
5:00 p.m., he was drinking with Augusta (Bong Kuleleng) near the house of
Ernesto Guzman.
b. At about 5:00 p.m., he was
requested by Ernesto to buy gin. He left Ernesto and Augusta (who were
allegedly drinking) in order to buy a bottle of gin in a nearby store, about
200 meters away.
c. At the store, he met an acquaintance and they
talked for a while before returning. Upon his arrival at the place (where they
had a drinking spree) he noticed stain of blood in the place where they had
been drinking and Augusta was not there anymore.
d. He inquired from Ernesto the
whereabouts of Augusta and was told that the latter "went home
already". He then asked Guzman about the blood and was told that it was
the blood stain of a "butchered chicken."
e. At about 12:00 o'clock midnight,
Ernesto informed him about the killing of Augusta. Guzman narrated to him that
Augusta held his rooster by the neck and that his tattoo mark BCJ (Batang City
Jail) will be erased by him.
f. He did not report the killing to
the authorities. Guzman likewise requested ban to admit the killing but he
refused.
g. While in the house, Guzman filed
the case ahead. He was later arrested and investigated while looking for the
corpse. When brought to the police station, he was forced to admit the killing
of Augusto.
6.
RTC: Guilty
7.
Appealed and assigned the following errors
a. Erred in giving weight to the
testimony of Ernesto
b. Erred in convicting the accused
based on his written statement (exhibit F)
c. Erred in appreciating qualifying
circumstances of treachery and pre meditation
Issue:
Held:
Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial
evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity of such
conviction that:
1) there be more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Section 5, Rule 133 ]
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all
that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution sufficiently satisfies the quantum of proof
necessary to uphold a judgment of conviction. The following circumstances
proven by the prosecution indubitably point to the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime committed against Augusto Esguerra.
1. The fact that said victim was last seen on the day
he was killed in the company of the accused, drinking gin at the back of the
house of Ernesto Guzman
2. The fact that on the day after the drinking spree,
December 12, 1981, the accused himself admitted to Ernesto Guzman that he
stabbed his drinking companion and that the latter was 'nadisgrasya niya"
so he dumped the body of the victim in a hole being dug out for a toilet,
located at the yard of Ernesto
3. The fact that when he was turned over to Pat.
Arturo Angeles and Pat. Rogelio Castillo of the Northern Police District by the
barangay people who apprehended him, be admitted the truth of the charge of the
barangay residents that he killed someone and that he dumped the body of the
victim in a place being dug out as an improvised toilet. At the time the
barangay people started digging for the body of the victim, the appellant was
even instructing them as to the exact location where the body was buried
4. The fact that the place where be led the police
officers and the barangay residents, i.e. the toilet pit in the backyard of
Ernesto Guzman, was indeed the site where he buried the victim as the body of
the victim was found there after the digging
5. The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the
accused was wearing during the drinking spree were later recovered from the
place where the victim was buried
Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance
on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis for his conviction.
As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect since it has
the advantage of observing the demeanor of a witness while on the witness stand
and therefore can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not
Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's
testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence
for being hearsay is unavailing. This Tribunal bad previously declared that
a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience
Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a
crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which
only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely
learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of
his own knowledge: that is, which are derived from his own perception."
Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding the
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the
fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if
the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who
probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was
no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he
knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, be was testifying to the fact
that the appellant told him that he stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to the
truth of the appellant's statement.
That the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral
confession is competent evidence finds support in People v. Tawat [G.R. No. L-
62871, May 25, 1984, 129 SCRA 4311 which upheld the trial court's reliance on
an extrajudicial confession given, not to a police officer during custodial
interrogation, but to an ordinary farmer as the basis for conviction. The
Court's pronouncements in the aforesaid case find relevance in the instant
case:
The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him' (Sec.
29 Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be
also regarded as part of the res gestae.
The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent
as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in
its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)Proof of the contents of an oral
extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies
that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the
conversation or statement made by the accused [citing Underhill's Criminal
Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, Sec. 278, p. 551.] [at pp. 436-437; Emphasis
supplied.]
The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's
credibility as a witness considering his stature in the community as a member
of a religious movement participating in such activities as
"mañanita" and procession of the Fatima and Black Rosary [Rollo, p.
30.] In fact, on the day the killing took place, he left his house where
appellant and his companion, Esguerra were still drinking and went to the house
of Junior Isla to attend a "mañanita" and participate in the weekly
activity of bringing down the crucifix and the image of the Fatima [TSN,
September 2, 1982. p. 2] Besides, there was no showing at all that he was
actuated by improper motives in testifying against appellant so as to warrant
disregard of his testimony [People v. Magdueno, G.R. No. L-68699, September 22,
1986, 144 SCRA 210.] On the contrary, the evidence shows that even though the
appellant is not related at all to Guzman, the latter, as an act of generosity,
allowed the former to sleep in the porch of his house as the former had no
immediate relatives in Quezon City [TSN, August 9, 1983, p. 14.]
As to the testimony of Pat. Angeles and Pat. Castillo,
the police officers who apprehended the appellant, credence should be given to
their narration of how the appellant was apprehended and how he led the police
and the barangay residents to the place where he dumped the body of his victim
since those police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Appellant's defense to the prosecution's charge rests
on an uncorroborated and purely oral evidence of alibi. It has been ruled time
and again that courts look upon the evidence of alibi with suspicion and always
receive it with caution; not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable
but also because of its easy fabrication. To overcome the evidence of the
prosecution, an alibi must satisfy the test of "full, clear and
satisfactory evidence". This test requires not only proof that the accused
was somewhere else other than the scene of the crime but clear and convincing
proof of physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the place of
the commission of the crime.
The testimony of the accused himself believes any
claim of physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime since
according to him, the store where he allegedly bought another bottle of gin was
only 200 meters away. He was able to return to Guzman's house only after half
an hour since he still had a chat with an acquaintance at the store. Even
granting the truth of appellant's story that he was ordered by Guzman to buy a
bottle of gin at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and that he was back after
thirty minutes, it was not impossible for him to have committed the crime since
Guzman and his wife left appellant alone with the victim at around 6:00 o'clock
in the evening to attend the mananita at the house of Junior Isla. Thus, his
statements on the witness stand, far from demonstrating physical impossibility
of being at the scene of the crime, cast serious doubt on the veracity of his
alibi.
As the culpability of the accused has been established
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution, there is no need to
dwell on the admissibility of appellant's extra-judicial confession [Exh. F to
F-9; Rollo, p. 20, et seq.] His conviction can be sustained independently of
said confession.
However, in the absence of proof as to how the victim
was killed, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation cannot be properly appreciated. The killing must be considered
ashomicide only and not murder since the circumstance qualifying the killing
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself [People v. Vicente, G.R.
No. L-31725, February 18, 1986, 141 SCRA 347.] This Tribunal clearly pointed
out in a previous case that
As heretofore stated, not a single eyewitness to the
stabbing incident had been presented by the prosecution. Thus, the record is totally
bereft of any evidence as to the means or method resorted to by appellant in
attacking the victim. It is needless to add that treachery cannot be deduced
from mere presumption, much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of
proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be
reached respecting the attendance of alevosia [People v. Duero, G.R No. 65555,
May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 515, 519-520; Emphasis supplied. ]
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation be considered, absent a clear showing of
1. the time when the of tender determined to commit
the crime;
2. an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung
to his dead termination; and
3. a sufficient laspe of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act [People v. Diva, G.R. No. L-22946, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468;
People v. Pacada, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-44444-45, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 427.]
As the evidence on record does not disclose the
existence of treachery and evident premeditation in the stabbing of the victim,
the crime committed is only HOMICIDE and not murder, Since there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty for homicide which is
reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the imposable penalty is from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Absent any proof of actual damages, the heirs of
Augusta Esguerra are entitled only to the indemnity of P 30,000.00. Hence, the
amount
of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court should be
reduced accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the
accused- appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of HOMICIDE, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of
Augusto Esguerra in the amount of P 30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
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