Catuira v. CA 236 SCRA 398 (1994)

Catuira v. CA

236 SCRA 398 (1994)

Facts:

1.     2 Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira for having issued 2 checks in payment of her obligation to private complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to cover the same, which checks upon presentment for payment were dishonored by the drawee bank

2.     After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence)

a.      contended that the testimony of Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify

b.     even if the testimony of Ocampo was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.

3.     TC: Denied MTD. Denied MR

4.     Petitioner elevated her case to the CA through a petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus.- Denied

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals erred when it accepted the testimony of private respondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not offered at the time she was called to testify

Held: No

Petitioner contended that the testimony should have been stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which prohibits the court from considering evidence which has not been formally offered; Also it was error for respondent appellate court to declare that her objection was not done at the proper time since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the admissibility of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time such testimony is presented xxx

The petition is devoid of merit. While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court:

While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence the testimony of the complaining witness upon calling her to testify and that it was only after her testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be stricken that the offer was made, the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing the case against the petitioner on the ground invoked. For, she should have objected to the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first offered upon calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already finished testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And for her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was waived.

If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice being served, her actuations should have been otherwise. Instead, she attempted to capitalize on a mere technicality to have the estafa case against her dismissed.

But even assuming that petitioner’s objection was timely, it was at best pointless and superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that the testimony of complaining witness is relevant and material in the criminal prosecution of petitioner for estafa.

Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made by the prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to be expunged from the record.

On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be admitted if only to satisfy the court’s sense of justice and fairness and to stress that substantial justice may not be denied merely on the ground of technicality.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the order of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 35, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss (by way of demurrer to evidence) is AFFIRMED.