Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC 161 SCRA 122 (1988)

Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp v NLRC

161 SCRA 122 (1988)

Facts:

1.     Private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by  petitioner PASCOR as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited.

2.     4 months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination.

3.     Pascor filed a complaint against Rances with the POEA for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination,"

4.     Rances denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign principal.

5.     POEA found Rances liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed 6 months suspension for each offense or a total of 12 months suspension, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer disciplinary sanction. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of private respondent.

6.     Rances filed a complaint against PASCOR with the POEA. In this complaint, he sought to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case No: M-84-09- 848. He claimed that he had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her]

7.     Rances further claimed that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month period, he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court.

8.     As evidence of this foreign award, Rances submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the transmittal letter are set out in the margin.

9.     In its answer, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments:

a.     that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated;

b.     that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings;

c.       that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and

d.     that the claim had already been resolved, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim.

10.   POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00.

11.   PACSOR filed 'Memorandum on Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration

12.   Rances moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for issuance of a writ of execution, upon the ground that petitioner's appeal had been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and that, consequently, the POEA decision had become final and executory.

13.   Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution, arguing that the one (1) day delay in filing its Memorandum on Appeal had been occasioned by an excusable mistake.

14.   POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time

15.   Petitioner moved for reconsideration.

16.   POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC.

17.   NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as filed out of time. Petitioner's MR was similarly denied.

18.   In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraint  Order, Pascor urges that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

WON the decision of the Dubai Court is admissible as evidence

Held: No

An examination of the complaint and of the Manifestation and Motion filed by Rances in POEA Case No: M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai Court which purported to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain circumstances.

It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only the Dubai Court decision; he did not submit any copy of the 'Compromise Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to writing) which he presumably believed to have been absorbed and superseded by the Dubai decision.

Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court.

Under Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen."

Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon the employer - employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi- judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before the POEA.

Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still respondent Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms:

Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.

There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non- official language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino.

In Ahag v. Cabiling,  Mr. Justice Moreland elaborated on the need for a translation of a document written in a language other than an official language:

... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than Spanish, if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated into Spanish by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this court. In the case before us, there is an untranslated exhibit written in the Visayan language.

In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,  the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, had occasion to stress the importance of having a translation made by the court interpreter who must, of course, be of recognized competence both in the language in which the document involved is written and in English. The Court said:

[t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation given by the Chinese Embassy, specially in the absence of a delete assurance that said translation was correct and that it was made by the Embassy Adviser himself. On the other hand, the translation made by the court interpreter is official and reliable not only because of the recognized ability of said interpreter to translate Chinese characters into English, but also because said interpreter was under the direct supervision and control of the court. ....

In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.

The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis of the English translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to the litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely be enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court.  

Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.

Finally, if it be assumed that the Dubai Court had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign principal — Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. — it still would not follow that Pascor would automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with persons like respondent Rances. Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.

We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Decision dated and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Orders denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration.

This, however, is without prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate another proceeding before the POEA against petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment which existed between said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances may seek to show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer to his wife.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Resolutions of public respondent NLRC are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

* Issue on delay of appeal

In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraint ' Order, Pascor urges that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.

We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent to delay the proceedings but rather a genuine and substantial effort on the part of petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its Memorandum on Appeal which, in the circumstances of this case, should not have been disregarded by respondent NLRC. The circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing of petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed up by petitioner in the following terms:

30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as messenger in the law firm representing the petitioner was tasked with the delivery of the memorandum on appeal in the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for filing the same).

30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the memorandum, he noted that the same is addressed to the respondent NLRC and he erroneously concluded that it should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in Intramuros, Manila.

30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at the docket section of respondent NLRC, he was advised that the same should be filed with the offices of the POEA in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila.

30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error immediately proceeded to the offices of the POEA in order to have petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received but unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA office had already closed for the day. Thus, the appeal was filed the following day.

To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 May 1986 executed by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of respondent NLRC stating that she had read to receive the Memorandum on Appeal on or about 4:15 P.M., 28 April 1986, because the Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA office in Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.

The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient basis for giving due course to the appeal. In the present case, however, the factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the case urged by the petitioner to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC should have recognized and heeded the requirements of orderly procedure and substantial justice which are at stake in the present case by allowing the appeal.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on appeal should not be strictly construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since on its face the appeal appears to be impressed appeal especially with merit.